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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
ARTICLE
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LIMITATIONS OF TIME

CPLR 202: Interplay between long-arm jurisdiction and tolling of
the statute of limitations.
CPLR 202, known as the "borrowing" statute, provides that
a cause of action accruing in favor of a nonresident without the
state is barred if the period of limitations has expired either in
New York or in the state in which the action arose. This provision is intended to prevent bringing suit in New York in an attempt
to revive a dead cause of action.' When a statute is "borrowed,"
the time limitation is accompanied by all of its local qualifications
regarding tolling and extensions.2 Thus, the court in Cellura v.
Cellura 3 relied on Texas law which provided that the Texas
statute had been tolled due to the defendant's absence from Texas
despite the availability of personal jurisdiction via a "long-arm"
statute. Therefore, the New York action was not barred. In
Burris v. Alexander Mfg. Co., 4 the court reached an opposite conclusion because the applicable Tennessee statute of limitations was
not tolled during defendant's absence from the state when "longarm" jurisdiction was available.
Apart from merely illustrating how an opposite result is
reached by applying the Cellura rationale, the Burris case marks
a new development in that approach. The Burris cause of action
accrued prior to the effective date of Tennessee's "long-arm" provision. As Tennessee had not yet adjudicated the question of
retroactivity, the court applied New York law' to hold the jurisdictional provision retroactive.
The case indicates New York's disposition to apply its own
law, in this case hostile to plaintiff, where the law of the accrual
state is unresolved. This approach permits a situation to arise
where a later and more favorable interpretation by the foreign
state could not benefit the plaintiff. The New York adjudication
would give the defendant a res judicata defense to subsequent
actions both in New York 6 and in the foreign jurisdiction. 7 Since
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758 (1937); Hull v. Hull, 225 N.Y. 342, 122 N.E. 252 (1919).
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this possibility occurs only when the law of another state is
unsettled, the practitioner is advised to refrain from bringing suit
in New York until the issues of retroactivity and tolling are
resolved in a foreign suit.
ARTICLE

3-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT

CPLR 302(a) (1).:

Section held applicable to non-conmercial
transactions of business.

A distinct conflict has developed as to whether the transaction

of business of a non-commercial character lies within the ambit of
CPLR 302 (a) (1). In Willis v. Willis,8 the supreme court, New
York County, held that as a matter of legislative intent the
execution of a separation agreement in New York did not confer
jurisdiction on the courts of this state under CPLR 302(a) (1).
The court construed the word "business" in the statute to apply
solely to "commercial" transactions.
The supreme court, Nassau County, has not acceded to this
view of the statute. In Todd v. Todd,9 the court, while holding
service under CPLR 308 invalid, indicated by way of dictum that
"there may well be a basis for maintaining the action in New
York, for the separation agreement was apparently entered into
in New York. . . ." '0 In a more recent case, Kochenthal v.
Kochenthal,11 the court directly confronted this issue and refused
to adhere to the Willis decision. The court stated that it did "not
hold to the belief that the statute . . . must be so narrowly con-

strued as to be applicable only to pecuniary transactions of a
commercial nature." 12

The court in Kochenthal attempted to distinguish Willis on
the basis of the fact that the defendant in Kochenthal was a resident
of New York at the time of the execution and negotiation of the

agreement and had subsequently left the state, whereas Willis
842 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).

951 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 644, 646 (1967).
10 Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966). The supreme court, Monroe County, while dismissing
a suit based on a separation agreement for failure to state a cause of action,
has also stated in dictum that it is not convinced of the validity of the
Willis decision. Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d 709
(Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966).
1152 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
12 Id. at 441, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 954.

